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Abstract
Maloney  develops  a view of the informal sector  in  work from  Latin America,  he offers alternative
developing countries  primarily  as an unregulated  micro-  explanations  for many  of the characteristics  of the
entrepreneurial  sector and not as a disadvantaged  informal  sector customarily regarded as evidence  of its
residual of segmented labor markets.  Drawing  on recent  inferiority.
This paper-a product of the Office of the Regional  Chief Economist,  Latin America and  the Caribbean Region-is part
of a larger effort  in the region  to understand  the impact of macroeconomic  crises.  Copies  of the paper are available  free
from the World Bank,  1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Patricia Soto,  room 18-018, telephone
202-473-7892,  fax 202-522-7528,  email address psoto@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The author may be contacted  at wmaloney@worldbank.org.  January 2003. (23
pages)
The  Policy Research Working Paper  Seoes  dissem  bates  the findings of  a  ork In  progress to encourage  the exchange of Ideas about
development tssues. An objective of  the series is to  get the fiindings  out quickly,  eveni if  the presentations are less than fully  polished The
papers carry the names of the authors and should  be cited accordingly The findings, interpretations, and conclusions  expressed in this
paper are  entirely those of the authors  They do not necessarily represent  the viewJ of the World Bank,  its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent
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Three  decades  of research  have  not  yielded  consensus  either  on  the  definition  of the
informal  sector  or  its  razon de ser.'  Broadly  speaking,  the  small-scale,  semi-legal,  often  low-
productivity,  frequently  family-based,  perhaps  pre-capitalistic  enterprise  continues  to  employ
between  30%  and  70%  of  the  urban  work  force  in  Latin  America.  A  long  tradition  views
informal  workers  as  comprising  the  less-advantaged  sector  of a  dualistic  or  segmented  labor
market.'  Above market-clearing wages force workers to queue for preferred jobs while subsisting
in the informal  sector,  that is characterized  by an absence  of benefits,  irregular work conditions,
high  turnover  and,  overall,  lower  rates of remuneration.  A recent variant on the  dualism  view,
albeit  with  different  emphasis,  sees  informalization  as  an effort  by  firms  facing  international
competition  to  reduce  these  legislated  or  union  induced  rigidities  and  high  labor  costs,
particularly through subcontracting production out to unprotected workers.3
Recent evidence  suggests that that such a view does not convincingly  describe the  Latin
American  case.  This review,  while looking at several  countries,  draws  particularly heavily  on
my own work looking at Mexico and does not pretend to do provide an exhaustive  account of the
literature.  Nonetheless,  this particular  case  is  an  important  one  for  several  reasons.  First,
despite compelling  descriptions  of the  inflexibility,  inefficiency  and  costliness of the  Mexican
labor  code,4 the  usual  sources  of wage  rigidity  that  would  segment  the  market  seem  absent:
minimum wages have not been binding for the  last decade,  unions  to date have primarily  been
concemed about preserving employment rather than raising remuneration,  and wages have shown
See Peattie (1987), Fields (1990), Turnham & Erocal (1990), Tokman (1992), Portes and Schauffler, (1993)
for excellent overviews.
2  The Harris-Todaro  (1970)  model is perhaps the traditional statement of this view.  See most recently Chandra
and Khan 1992, Chandra 1994, Loayza 1994.
3  See Beneria 1989, Portes, Castells and Benton 1989, Portes and Schauffler 1989,  and Roberts 1989 in the
Structural Articulation school. Piore and Sabel, 1987, Gordon, Edwards and Reich,  1983,  more generally in the
decentralization  school.
4 See Davila Capalleja (1997)extraordinary  downward  flexibility  during  crises.5 Second,  Mexico  is  blessed  with  excellent
panel  employment surveys that allow following workers among sectors over time and observing
how their earnings  may change.  The view that  emerges from these  data,  time  series  data from
other  Latin  American  countries,  and  global  cross  sectional  data  correspond  more  to  an
unregulated  entrepreneurial  sector  that  behaves  like  small  firm  sectors  everywhere,  than  one
comprised of  involuntary, disadvantaged, precarious, or underpaid workers.
The core of the informal sector- the self-employed
Self-employment  in Mexico  constitutes  the  largest  source  of employment  among  men
(25%),  after  formal  salaried  employment  (50%).  Table  1 shows  that,  of those  workers  who
started  in  the  formal  salaried  sector  but  move  into  informal  self-employed  sector  15  months
later,6 two-thirds  report moving voluntarily,  citing a desire  for greater  independence  or higher
pay as the principal motives. These findings are consistent with the sociologists Balan, Browning
and Jelin's  (1973)  extensive  interviews with Monterrey workers who  state that being one's own
boss was well-regarded  and that movements into self-employment  from salaried positions often
represented  an improvement  in job status.7 This  also broadly  consistent  with interview  data
from Argentina:  A small survey in the province of Jujuy revealed that 80% of the self-employed
had no desire to change jobs and under  18% saw self-employment  as a temporary  activity before
they found a "real" job.8 In Gran Buenos Aires, another survey found that while 36% would have
5 See Maloney and Ribeiro (1998) and Maloney (2000)
6This is done by linking the Encuesta Nacional de Micro-Empresas  (ENAMIN) with the Encuesta Nacional de
Empleo Urbano (ENEU).  The ENEU permits following workers over a 15 month period and hence  studying their
transitions among sectors.
7 These results are very close to Gottshalk and Maloney's (1985) finding that roughly 70% of U.S. job changes  are
voluntary.  Put differently, if self-employment given the common earnings differentials, are close substitutes for
formal salaried work, the implied  rates of  involuntary entry would be normal by the standards of a flexible
industrialized country market.
8 Micro-enterprise Study for Jujuy, Consultoria Nordeste,  Fondo de Capital Social (FONCAP).
2preferred to work more hours, only 26% were looking for other work. 9  In Paraguay,  only 28%
of those in the informal sector stated a desire to change  occupations.  Among those often thought
to be the worst off, informal workers, the percent rose only to 32%.lo
Panel data from the Mexican  National Urban Employment  Survey (ENEU) show that, as
in  industrialized  countries,  self-employment  is not an entry occupation from school and there is
little evidence  that the sector serves  as a holding pattern for young workers.  Transitions  into self-
employment  from the  other paid sectors  occur  4 to 6 years  later than transitions  into  formal or
informal  salaried work leaving the mean age 8 years higher than the next closest  sector."' This is
supportive  of the  findings  of Balan  et. al.,  and increasingly  elsewhere,  for  a  "life  cycle"  model
where  workers enter into salaried work,  accumulate knowledge,  capital,  and contacts,  and  then
quit to open their own informal businesses."2
The Guadalajaran sociologist Gonzalez  de la Rocha (1994) is almost certainly correct  that
for many older workers,  the sector  does provide  a safety net by offering  "insecure  occupations
(such as the services) in which their age is not a limitation after they have been kicked out of the
formal manufacturing  or formal services."  This dynamic may have been of particular relevance
during  the economic restructurings  of the 1990s where older displaced  workers may have found
their  skills obsolescent  and little  demanded  in the  emerging  sectors.  She  does  also, however,
suggest some degree of voluntary  movement when she says that  "Older men may also find the
pace of industrial (formal) work too arduous and leave  such jobs."'3 This more voluntary take is
stressed  by  her  anthropologist  colleagues  Selby,  Murphy  and  Lorenzen  (1991)  who  note  the
9 SIEMPRO/FONCAP  (1998) "Perfiles de la Microempresa".
10Direcci6n General de Estadistica, Encuestas y Censos, Republica de Paraguay, "Sector Informal," based on the
Encuesta Integrada de Hogares 1997/1998.
'1 See Maloney (1999), and Aroca and Maloney (1998).
12 See  Lopez-Castanio  (1990)  in Colombia,  Fields (1990),  and Peattie (1982)  who find a tendency
for employees  of large firms to leave and open their own.  This is likely to be due to the  same kind
of credit constraints found binding in industrialized countries.  See Evans and Jovanovic (1989).
13 See Maloney (1999) Labor Markets Regional Study.  The anthropology literature also weighs in on this point as
well when Selby, Murphy and Lorenzen argue "On average, opportunity costs to these worker in terms of foregone
earnings in, say, registered  blue-collar employment may be quite low.(p.  147)"surprising  desirability  of informal  sector  employment  as  the  basis  for  a  household  earning
strategy, particularly for poorer, older household with lower educational qualifications."14
On balance,  sociological  and  anthropological  studies are  consistent with the findings of
the  Mexican,  Argentine  and  Paraguayan  micro-enterprise  surveys  that  most  self-employed
choose  to be so,  as well  as the view that workers may enter formal sector employment  initially
partly  as  a  means  to  accumulate  human  and  physical  capital.  This  leads  to  an  intriguing
inversion of the traditional  dualist view.  If firms must pay "efficiency" or above market clearing
wages to dissuade their workers from opening their own firms, this creates a segmented  market.
It  may  be  the  attractiveness  of  informal  self-employment  that  causes  dualism  rather  than  a
segmented market causing informality. 1 s
But don 't informal workers earn less?
Table  1 shows  that  Mexican  workers  who  voluntarily  enter  self-employment  gained
roughly  25%  leaving  salaried  formal  employment.  However  such  wage  comparisons  are
fundamentally  meaningless  and  we should probably  not use them as measures  of segmentation
and job quality.  The reason  is that if workers were  to choose between sectors,  they would take
into account  not  only the  wage,  but  all other  characteristics  and benefits  associated with each
possible job.
Several  examples  may  make  this  clearer.  First,  if  the  formal  sector  pays  benefits--
pensions, health insurance,  housing subsidies, day care-- which the informal sector does not, then
in  a market  with no distortions, the wage  in the  unprotected  sector would need to be above  the
formal sector to compensate  for the lost benefits.  This higher wage, of course, would not imply a
superior job-only that more of the total remuneration was paid in cash instead of benefits. On the
other  hand,  income  taxes support  public goods  from which tax-avoiding  informal workers  can
14  Selby, Murphy, Lorenzen  1991  144
15  See Maloney (forthcoming) and Krebs and Maloney (1999) for an elaboration of this view.
4not be excluded (national  defense for example),  and therefore  dictate that formal sector workers
need to be paid more to compensate  for the taxes they can't avoid.  Further,  formal work-places
may be cleaner  and safer,  but, as in the industrialized world  and as table 1 suggests, being ones'
own boss and having flexibility is very valuable too and is worth taking a wage cut for.  Finally,
starting a business  is risky  anywhere  and  we should expect  to  find higher  incomes  among this
group to compensate them for this risk.
Though  informal  salaried workers  always  earn consistently less,  this may be  due to the
fact  that  they are often  related  to the  owners  of the enterprises  where  they work  and thus may
receive  unobserved  payments  in  kind  (food,  lodging).  Further,  to  the  degree  that  the  sector
appears  to  play  a job  training  role  for  young  workers,  some  fraction  of  the  salary  may  be
deducted to cover implicit training costs.
To  summarize,  in  a  market  with  no  distortions  and  hence  no  segmentation,  workers
would  equate  utility,  or  the  total  "package"  of  benefits,  not  just  wages.  To  establish
segmentation,  we  would  need  to  add  up  all  of the  factors  discussed  above,  many  of  them
unmeasurable,  and  show that formal  sector  workers  were better  off-  an impossible  task.  This
implies that comparisons  of wages cannot be tests for segmentation.  It also  implies that the fact
that informal  salaried  workers  may  earn less than  formal  salaried workers  does  not imply  that
they are "poorer" when measured in terms of total welfare.
Isn 't the informal sector the safety netfor displacedformal  sector workers?
The traditional  "dualistic"  view would argue  that as the economy  enters a recession,  we
should find workers being  forced into the informal  sector, driving down wages there relative  to
the formal  sector wage.  This does seem to be the case in Colombia  after 1995, a period of deep
recession due to a financial crisis combined with a very ill-advised  but very dramatic  rise in the
minimum  wage  that  accentuated  the segmentation  in  the  economy.  Figure  1 shows  that  the
relative  size  of the  formal  sector  relative  to  the  informal  self-employed  sector  fell  while  its
5relative wage rose- exactly the pattern predicted by the dualistic view.  But figure 2 suggests that
the  1987-93  period  was  very  different  in  Mexico.  Here  the  share  of the  workforce  in self-
employment  grew at  the same time that the self-employed  went from earning roughly the same
amount as formal salaried workers, to 30%  more by 1992.  The boom in construction and other
non-tradeables  offered  many  good  jobs  to  informal  skilled  workmen,  and  this  is  when  they
choose  to open their businesses.16  This pattern  reverses somewhat  going into the crisis of 1995
where there  is an increase  in the size of the self-employed  sector at the  same time that relative
self-employed  earnings  are falling.  But, the point here  is not to show  that the  informal  sector
never serves  as  a  safety  net.  Rather,  the point is  that most of the  time,  the  vast  majority  of
entrepreneurs want to be in the sector, that it should  not be treated as inherently inferior.
Perhaps  figure  3  is  the  most  provocative.  It  suggests  that,  in  Brazil,  informal  self-
employment rises at the same time that its relative earnings are roughly stable or rising.  As some
observers  have argued,  during the periods of high inflation, self-employment  is preferred:  fo.mal
wages  are indexed  intermittently  and hence  lose purchasing power while  the self-employed  can
index  daily.  The  post  -1994  period  after  stabilization,  however,  suggests  a  long period  of
decline in relative formal/informal  incomes and a decline in formality.  Without question, as the
ILO and the Economic  Commission on Latin America have noticed,  informality is rising across
the period. But the critical question is whether it was voluntary!
Another  counterintuitive  finding  appears  in table  2.  Here we're  use  panel  data  from
Mexico  and Argentina to ask the unemployed what sector they entered from.  Surprisingly,  75%
of the unemployed  in  Mexico  and  64%  in Argentina  were  informal  previously.  And  although
their unemployment  spells  are 30% lower than those of formal sector workers, it is not the case
that  they  instantly  find  new  informal  jobs.  So  the  sector  is  not  simply  or  even  primarily
absorbing the unemployed  from the formal  sector.  As  we'll see later, there is a logical reason
why this may be the case.
16 See Maloney  (1998)
6But why would workers voluntarily give up these  formal sector benefits?
There  are  several  reasons  why  workers  may  be  willing  to  voluntarily  become
"unprotected"  and  rely  more  on  informal  safety  nets.  First,  developing  country  micro-
entrepreneurs  may  not be  fundamentally  different  from their  counterparts  in  the  industrialized
world  who  also  take  on responsibility  for medical  insurance  or  saving for retirement  that was
previously  covered by their employers.  Second,  since  in a market with flexible  wages,  the cost
of employer-provided  benefits  is partially passed  down  to workers  the  form of lower wages.  If
workers  don't value  the  benefits  as  much  as  the  fall  in wages,  they will seek  out jobs  in the
unregulated  sector  where  remuneration  is  entirely  monetary.  This  might  happen  if  social
security or health  benefits provision is very inefficient,  if there  are very weak  linkages between
benefits and contributions, or if one member of the family is already formal and hence the rest of
the  family  already  receives  benefits.  Third,  Balan  et.  al.'s  interviews  suggest  that  the  very
legislation  that  is  thought  to  induce  rigidities  into  the  labor  market  in  fact  stimulates  such
turnover  and  encourages  workers  to  leave  salaried  employment.  The paucity  of openings  for
promotion  on the  rigid escalafon as well  as  the  ceiling  on mobility  opportunities  for  manual
workers  makes  self-employment  the  remaining  outlet for  further advancement.  These  last  two
issues suggest that,  in contrast  to the usual view,  the extant  labor protections  may make formal
sector work less desirable, rather than less attainable.
But doesn 't the large size of the informal sector imply large labor  market distortions ?
The  argument  that  informal  employment  can  be  desirable  is  most  compelling  where
micro- firms  can offer remuneration  comparable  to that earned  in the formal  sector- among low
education workers  unlikely to generate much firm specific capital.  Observing Mexican informal
workers,  the  anthropologists  Selby,  Murphy  and  Lorenzen  confurm  that  "On  average,  the
opportunity  costs  to these  workers in  terms of foregone  earnings  in,  say, registered  blue-collar
employment may be quite  low."(p.  147)  This view is supported statistically  by logit analysis of
7Argentine  and  Mexican worker  movements  between  sectors  that finds  that they  become  less
likely  to leave  formal  employment  for self-employment,  or any  other informal  sector,  as their
education level  increases.  At a global level,  figure 4 suggests that  as formal  sector productivity
increases  with  development,  the  share  of the  workforce  in  self-employment  falls.  When  we
control for productivity (or GDP) and other relevant demographic variables, Latin America  does
not  have  an  unusually  large  share  of its  workforce  in  informal  self-employment:  Mexico  and
Brazil  are  below  average,  perhaps  suggesting  more  flexible  than  average  labor  markets.
Argentina is above average suggesting the reverse.
This same pattern  appears within countries if we assume that more educated  workers will
have  higher  productivity  in  firms  than  in  self-employment,  either  because  of associated  firm
specific  capital  or greater  specialization.  Figures  5a-5b  plot  the  ratio  SE+FS/SE  vs  years  of
education for Argentina,  Brazil and Mexico.  We find the same downward  slope in all countries
that suggests that as  workers have  more education,  the opportunity  cost of being self-employed
rises and correspondingly they are more likely to choose to be salaried workers.
Another way to approach the question is to assume it exists because of distortions and ask
how much remuneration  in the formal sector would need to fall to eliminate the informal  sector.
Given that own wage labor demand elasticities in manufacturing tend to range from -.2 to  .517  a
10% increase  in the size of the formal sector  would require a 20-50%  decrease  in formal sector
remuneration.  If,  as is often the case, the  informal sector is half of the workforce,  the  necessary
fall in formal  sector wages implied is vast and  far  above any  measured  differentials  in the two
sectors.  Further,  in figures 5a-5c,  we might argue  that less educated workers are more likely to
find minimum  wages binding.  However,  the evidence  for such distortions we might not expect
the  smooth  kernel  density plots  in  all  three  countries  find  no impact  of minimum  wages  on
formal wages (See Maloney and Nunez 2001).
Isn't informal workprecarious?
Many of the characteristics we associate  with informality are, in fact, natural by-products
17  Fajnzylber  and Maloney (2000) estimate own wage labor demand elasticities for blue collar manufacturing
8of the fact that the informal, cuenta-propista  or patron is fundamentally  a micro-entrepreneur--the
owner  of  a  small  firm.  The  industrialized  country  literature  on  firm  behavior  offers  two
important  findings  about  such  firms.  First,  there  is a wide range  of sizes among longstanding
firms determined by such factors  as how efficient or hardworking  an entrepreneur  is, how well-
placed  his/her  firm  is, what  the  logic  of the  production  process is etc.  This  means  that  the
existence  of many  small  firms  does  not  necessarily  imply  failure  of  either  labor  or  credit
markets.  It may be that the reason that 80% of micro-firms  have only one or two employees  and
tend  to be  family  based  reflects  a  logic that  has  roots  in the  tradition of the  family farm,  or
reflects the sustainable reach of informal  contracting  relations.  This could explain,  for instance
the finding that only 10% of urban Mexican micro-firms report plans for expansion  and only  9%
report that lack of credit is a major business problem.18
A  second  finding  about  small  firms  everywhere  is  their  extraordinarily  high  rates  of
failure.  Seeking to explain the US case, the economic theorist  Jovanovic  (1982) argues  that this
is  due  to  the  fact  that entrepreneurs  cannot  know how  good  their  location is, or  how good  an
entrepreneur  they  are until  they  actually start  the business.  Very soon after  starting, many  find
that they  are not viable  and  fail.  The sociology literature  provides striking confirmation of this
insight when Balan, Browning and Jelin argue that although self-employment  is a goal for many
Mexican workers:
Becoming  self-employed  involves a large risk, especially for those men who had
stable and secure jobs.  Income  is uncertain,  in particular  during the first perilous
years  of the business.  Often the men lack the financial and administrative  skills
needed for successful operation of the enterprise.  Most men are aware of the fact
that  many small  shops and  stores  close soon after  opening.  Some men therefore
proceed with much care when they decide to become  self-employed. (p 216-217).
That said, rough calculations from the Mexican micro-enterprise  survey suggest that these firms,
show high failure rates, but not particularly higher than those in the US.
If  we  add  a  new  view  of "formality"  to  this  picture,  we  can  generate  most  of the
workers  to be -.29 for Chile, -.49 for Colombia, and -.18 for Mexico.
18 See Cunningham and Maloney, forthcoming.
9characteristics  of the  sector,  but without implying  any  inferiority  or undesired  precariousness.
Alec  Levenson  and  I  treat  "formality"  as  participation  in the numerous  institutions  of civil
society:  federal  and local  treasuries,  governmental  programs  such  as  social  security  (including
pensions and health care), the legal system, the banking system, health inspection, firm censuses,
trade organizations,  civic organizations,  etc.  These, of course, have costs in terms of compliance
with  legal  norms  which  very  small  firms  can  choose  to  avoid  in  many  developing  countries.
Small  firms  are  anchored  in social networks  of family  and immediate neighborhood  that allow
them  to  enforce  implicit  contracts,  insure  against  risks  etc.  and  participation  in  the  formal
institutions  of civil  society  is needlessly  expensive.  However,  as firms grow  they increasingly
need to secure property rights or permit formal contracting mechanisms,  pool risk, gain access to
credit--  all things that  become  increasingly  important  as firms grow.  De Soto (1989) offers  a
striking example where  informal street vendors in Peru  tried not to avoid, but to pay their taxes
since  this  would  guarantee  them  some property  rights  over  their  pitch and  hence  offer  some
security  to  investments  they  wanted  to make.  Statistically,  the data  from  the  Mexican micro-
enterprise survey suggests that  firms do become more formal with age and size.19
Combining  the  two  characteristics  of micro-firms  and  our  notion  of formality  implies
that small firms will have higher costs, are likely to be informal,  and will have very high failure
rates.  Though  this  corresponds  exactly  to  the  standard  picture  of the  stagnant,  precarious,
unprotected  informal  worker  familiar  in  the  literature,  it  is,  in  fact,  the  opposite.  It  emerges
naturally from the workers trying their luck at  entrepreneurship  (risk taking),  often failing,  and
not  engaging  in  the  formal  institutions  until  they  grow.  In  sum,  there  may  be  nothing
pathological  about  the  informal  sector  firm  and  its  existence  may  be  largely  unrelated  to
questions of labor market dualism or even credit market distortions.
But this also may explain the high rates of entry into unemployment found in table  2.  If
small  firms  have  high  mortality  rates,  both  owners  and  the  workers  are  more  likely  to  find
themselves without employment and searching for a new job.
9 Levenson and Maloney (1999)
10Gonzalez  de  la  Rocha  provides  a  compelling  explanation  of  the  life  cycle  pattern
discussed earlier based on the household's capacity  to manage these risks.  Her interviews  show
that  the  heads of young families  are  more  likely  to  be found  in manufacturing  while  heads  of
";consolidated" households  can  move  into  less  onerous  but more  risky  informal  service  jobs
precisely  because  their  mature  children  provide  a  hedge  against  the  risk.  Further,  Balan,
Browning  and  Jelin  argue  that  it  is  common  for  workers  contemplating  opening  a  firm  to
maintain their  formal sector job until the micro-enterprise  is safely  established,  perhaps  staffed
by the wife or mature children,  thereby effectively  maintaining a diversified portfolio  of income
streams.20 In sum, for workers desiring to become self-employed,  there are informal strategies for
managing risk.
Doesn 't the informal sector show lower overall  productivity growth?
This is very likely to be the case, but not because of informality per se. Traditionally,  the
big gains  in productivity  occur in the tradeables  sectors  and  often (although  not exclusively)  in
manufactures.  This differential  in productivity growth underlies  Balassa's (1964) theory of why
the  real  exchange  rate  appreciates  as  countries  develop.21 Informal  businesses  tend  to  be
concentrated  in  services,  transport,  commerce  in the  like where  productivity  gains  are  hard  to
achieve:  A haircut still takes about 20 minutes in Washington or Bogota.  But this doesn't mean
that  wages  of  informal  barbers  won't  rise  over  time.  As  productivity  rises  in  the  formal
20 "The  worker in  the Fundidora  .... for instance,  was  extremely cautious  whery he decided  to enter the ranks of the
self-employed,  after  twenty years  in  the plant.  His  timing was almost perfect.  For five  years he had been in  the
highest position  he could  expect to  attain,  so no more mobility could be anticipated  within  the plant.  His youngest
son was three years old, and now his wife would be more free of household concerns and could help in the store.  He
had saved  a considerable  amount of money  during his years in the steel plant.  In any even, when  he first opened  a
small shoe store, he did  not give  up his job in the factory until he was sure of the success of his business venture.  He
moonlighted  in  his  store  for  three  years,  his wife  tending  it  when  he  was not  present.  During  the  first  year  of
operation the store lost money, and in the second year it broke even. At the end of the third year it turned a profit so
he decided to leave the factor and devote his full time to the store."  p. 216-217.
21  Productivity  growth rises  in tradeables pushing up wages in both the tradeables  (formal) and non-tradeables
(informal) sectors.  But since  there has been no productivity growth in non-tradeables,  their price must rise relative  to
tradeables prices and the exchange rate defined as Pt/Pn must appreciate.  Rogoff and Obstfeld's  text book (1996)
does a nice job of both laying out the modem view of this as well as providing some empirical  evidence
11tradeables  sector, workers  are slowly pulled from the informal  sector, and wages must rise there
to keep  barbers from moving into formal  manufacturing.
Isn 'tformality  largely a way for larger  firms to avoid  protecting  their workers?
Since only 20% of Mexican  informal workers are found to be affiliated with larger firms
clearly  sub-contracting  relations  are  not  the dominant  modality  of informal  firm behavior.  But
further,  it appears  that the path of earnings  across time of those who worked  in subcontracting
relations  followed  very  closely  those  who  were  independent.  This  suggests  that  common
motivations  may underlie  a worker's decision to engage  in sub-contracting,  and that  the  sector
may  not  represent  inferior  work.  This  is  supported  by  the  sociologist  Bryan  Roberts'(1989)
interviews  with  Guadalajaran  workers  that  suggest  that,  given  the  very  weak  unions  and  low
wages  in  Mexico,  informalization  is  not  primarily  a  strategy  for  reducing  remuneration  and
worker  control  over  production:  "Market  uncertainty  and  the  large  number  of  income
opportunities  in  the  city  mean  that  it  is  useful  for  both  employees  and  employers  to  have
flexibility in allocating labor."(italics added, p. 48).  More  generally,  it  is  possible  that  sub-
contracting is not so much a way of avoiding labor legislation,  as avoiding the inefficiencies  in it.
The  differentials  between  costs  to firms  and  value  to workers  of benefits  discussed previously
offer  a benign interpretation  of  informal subcontracting  as a way of reducing  firm costs where
contract workers gain some of the value of  benefits foregone.  Some caveats  are in order for the
end of the 1990s.  Here, remuneration to subcontracted  workers in Mexico appears to fall relative
to  self-employed  and  to  formal  sector workers  suggesting that the  quality of employment may
have fallen.
Doesn't the large number of women in informal self-employment suggest discrimination  in the
12formal sector?
The  high level  of female  participation  in  self-employment  which  has  sometimes  been
attributed  to  discrimination  that  leaves  women  regulated  to  inferior jobs.  Cunningham  (1999)
found  that, while  it is true that single mothers  have high levels of participation  in informal self
employment,  the fact that single women without children have the highest rate of participation  in
formal jobs of any group, male or female, makes discrimination seem unlikely. This does not, of
course, preclude  discrimination  against married women or those with children who may be likely
to be absent for work for long periods.  But Cunningham  argues that the  concentration  of these
two  groups  in self-employment  driven  by the  need  to  balance  household  responsibilities.  For
women attempting  to raise children  as well as  contribute to household  income,  the flexibility  of
the sector may make the sector even more desirable than for the men discussed earlier.
Aren 't the informal salaried  the most disadvantaged?
Even if the self-employed  benefit from being  their own bosses,  the  mainstream  view  is
that those who work for them are the very worst off of the urban workforce:  salaried,  yet without
benefits.  We've  already  discussed  how the  fact  that they  appear  to  earn  lower  wages  tells us
nothing about  whether  they  are truly worse  off.  Further,  rather  than being  a  stagnant group  of
disadvantaged  workers,  the  sector  appears  to  serve  primarily  as  the  principal,  although  not
exclusive, port of entry for young, poorly educated workers into paid employment. The mean age
in Mexico  of 29 is 5 years below that of formal sector and contract workers  and 14 years below
that of the self-employed  and the pattem is broadly  similar in Argentina.  The Mexican transition
data  show  a  high  degree  of mobility  between  school,  unpaid  work  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,
unemployment  that suggests  a pool  of workers  not  yet  tracked  into  regular  employment.  One
scenario  is  that while  and just  after  completing  school,  many  students  help  out  at  the family
business,  and eventually get paid.  Once becoming  salaried informal,  workers  spend on average
13only 2 years doing this before moving on to other paid work.  The brevity of tenure is the same as
that found in Brazil by Sedlacek  et. al.(1995)  and is similar to the U.S. where the median tenure
for young workers  16 to 24 years of age is only  1.4 years  and 25  to 34,  3.4 years.'  Further,  if
Hemmer  and Mannel  (1989) are correct  that in many countries  informal small  enterprises  train
more apprentices  and workers  than the formal education system and the mostly government job-
training  schemes together,  these years to large degree may constitute continued schooling.  Even
if this pattern of graduation  from school  to unpaid to informal salaried work  to other modes of
work  represents  the  queuing  that  the  dualistic  literature  might  predict,  the  wait  in  informal
salaried work is not long.
The sector appears precarious for two reasons.  First, Balan et. al. argue that this period of
life  for young workers is one of "shopping around"  and trying out various possible life choices,
and hence  they will  show short tenure.  Second,  the vast majority  of informal salaried  workers
are employed by informal micro-firms which, as discussed earlier, have higher turnover rates.
VII. Conclusions
The view of the informal sector sketched  here is not meant  to suggest that in periods of
great  recession  or  in  countries  with  very  distortionary  minimum  wages  and  regulation  the
traditional  dualistic view would not be a more appropriate model.  But what does seem clear in
Mexico  and arguably other Latin countries is that much or most of the sector represents a healthy,
voluntary small firm sector that should be treated as such.  Proposals for extending credit or other
micro-firm  services  should  be  grounded  in  a  solid  understanding  of the  dynamics  of  these
enterprises  and  of barriers  to their growth and absorption  of labor.  Proposals  to provide social
protection to the sector need to be grounded in an understanding  of the reasons that entrepreneurs
choose not to be formal.
Nor  do  I  mean  to  imply  that  there  is  no  need  for  reform  of  labor  legislation.  The
2  BLS News, USDL 92-386 for 1991.
14traditional  emphasis  on rigid  wages driving  segmentation  is probably  not  correct.  However,  I
have  argued, for example,  that informality  may  arise  partially  as a response  to inefficiencies  in
the  provision  of medical  benefits  or pensions,  promotion systems  not  based  on merit,  or other
distortions that make being paid in cash informally more desirable.  The recent reforms in Chile,
Colombia  and  Mexico  that  have  sought  to  bring  benefits  in  line  with  the  implicit  taxes  that
workers pay, for instance  individual  accounts for retirement pay,  are important  steps to reducing
incentives  to  being informal.  More fundamentally,  informal employment  in firms of relatively
low  technology  and  capital  intensity  can  only  be  attractive  if  the  overall  level  of  labor
productivity  in  the  formal  sector  is  low  also.  To  the  degree  that  current  legislation  impedes
investment in physical or human capital,  or prevents the  efficient organization  and operation  of
firms, it perpetuates  the low levels of productivity throughout the economy.
Finally,  I  do not  mean  to  suggest that the  sector  is  not relatively  poor.  However,  the
poverty is a function of low levels of human capital  and whether the worker is formal or informal
is largely  incidental. A workers  with few skills that would be rewarded in the formal sector may
prefer  to be independent:  S/he may  prefer being the master  of a lowly repair shop  to endlessly
repeating assembly tasks in a formal maquila.  Neither job will lead to an exit from poverty,  but
the  informal  option  may actually  offer  a  measure  of dignity  and autonomy  that the  formal job
does not.
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18Table 1: Real Hourly Wage Differential: Formal Salaried to Informal Self Employed
(In  percentage  change)
Share of  Mean  Median
Respondents  Differential  3/  Differential
National Urban  Employ. Survey  100  27.3***  23.6***
(ENEU)  1/
Micro-enterprise  Survey (ENAMIN):2/
Reason Left Previous  Job
More Independence  35  21.6**  19.6*
Higher Pay  32  16.7  12.1
Involuntary  29  -14.7  -4.1
Total  100  12.6**  10.0**
1/ Adjusted for hours worked and taxes. 2/ Adjusted for hours worked, taxes, capital costs, unpaid  workers. 3/
Mean employs Huber weights to redress non-normality.  * = sig. at 10%, ** 5%, ***I% level.
Table 2:  Sector of Origin of the Une  nployed
Argentina 1/  Mexico
Sector of Origin  All  Paid  All  Paid
Informal Self-Employed  18  38  9  40
Salaried Informal  12  26  7  35
Formal Salaried  17  36  5  25
Previously Unemployed  34  19
Previously Out of Labor Force  6  44
School Graduates  13  16
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%
Note:  Argentina includes only household heads while Mexico includes
all possible workers.  This is responsible for the very high share of OLF
in Mexico who may mostly be students.
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